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------------------------- Hans Toch and Malcolm S. MacLean, Jr.: From Hans Toch and Malcolm S. MacLean, Jr., "Perception and Communication: A Transactional View," Audio Visual Communication Review, 1967, 10, 55-77. Reproduced with permission of the authors and publisher. ----------------------- COMMON SENSE AND PERCEPTION Of most interest is common sense: Perception viewed through the eyes of common sense is clearly a passive affair. The eye is the equivalent of a motion picture camera, and hearing functions in the fashion of a tape recorder. The chemical senses act in the manner of variegated litmus paper; the mechanical senses register physical weights and measures. In other words, perception unassumingly transcribes on the slate of our awareness whatever the world presents to us. It dispassionately and uncritically records the gamut of bewildering impressions which reach us-mostly from without, but sometimes from within. This in formation, having been duly recorded, is then sorted, edited, and evaluated subsequently and-very importantly-elsewhere. In due fairness, one must add that common sense, when passed, may admit that there is probably more to the story. The senses, for example, don't appear to receive impressions at random: the eyes must be directed at some portion of the world, and the glass of wine must be sipped before anything of consequence is perceived in either case. Moreover, there is obviously some measure of control over the quality of the product: the languid gaze, the shameless stare, and the vacant look don't transmit comparable data. Sophisticated common sense also discovers that there is some question as to whether we always perceive equally well. Assuming, for example, that the cochlea responds with the same precision when a person sits in a concert hall or in his living room immersed in his newspaper, everyone knows that auditory awareness clearly differs in these situations. These and other observations of perception in action may suggest to common sense that the process is not altogether passive nor invariant. Perception seems to provide, within limits, the type of information the perceiver needs. Perception, in other words, is invoked, suppressed, and modified in the context of what the rest of the person is about. In order to be instrumental in this fashion, perception must be flexible and active. The vocabulary is full of words which imply recognition of this truism. The eye, for example, does not merely mirror or transmit; it scans, peeks, watches, stares, scrutinizes, and inspects. Such terms reflect a recognition of directionality, selection, or variability in perception. TRANSACTIONAL DEPARTURE FROM COMMON SENSE At this point, however, common sense assumes that it is the "user" of the perceptual process who is active, while perception itself is simply being manipulated. In other words, the perceptual apparatus is seen as subject to the same type of manipulation as the motion picture camera which may be switched on and off, variously aimed, and possibly even changed to different speeds at the whim of its owner and the flick of a switch. These manipulations, of course, would be viewed as extrinsic to the process of receiving and recording information. The transactional view does not accept this argument. It regards perception as continuously and inextricably enmeshed in the enterprise of living. Do we ever encounter perception as a "pure" process? Or, for that matter, can we conceive of a person be having without perceiving? Is not behavior both an outcome of past perceptions and a starting point for future perceptions? And is not the "user" of perception himself a perceptual result? This conclusion would clearly follow from the fact that every human being is a product--a constantly changing product-of the situations through which he moves. Each encounter with life leaves its chink in the armor or its depression in the hide; the person who arises in the morning is never the same one who returns to his pillow that evening. His successor may be broadened, chastised, wiser, or warier; his jaw may be more set or his brow more furrowed-more likely, he may see things a little differently or feel some what different. Whatever the change, it represents a deposit of perceptions and will, in turn, affect future perceptions. Perception, then-in transactional parlance-is so wedded to the rest of the human enterprise that it has no meaning outside this context. If common sense finds this conception hard to deal with, the next step may prove even harder to take. Because unlike common sense, which assumes that a person perceives the world, the transactional view denies the independent existence of both the perceiver and his world. The term "transaction" was first used by Dewey and Bentley to distinguish this new view of epistemology from the common sense "interaction" conception. Dewey and Bentley summarize their transactional approach to perception by saying, "Observation of this general (transactional) type sees man-in-action not as something radically set over against an environing world, nor yet as merely action 'in' a world, but as action of and by the world in which the man belongs as an integral constituent (7:228)." Ittelson and Cantril illustrate the meaning of this statement by considering the case of a baseball batter: It is immediately apparent that the baseball batter does not exist independent of the pitcher. We cannot have a batter without a pitcher. It is true that someone can throw a ball up in the air and hit it with a bat, but his relationship to the batter in the baseball game is very slight. Similarly, there is no pitcher without a batter. The pitcher in the bull-pen is by no means the same as the pitcher in the game. But providing a pitcher for a batter is still not enough for us to be able to define and study our batter. The batter we are interested in does not exist outside of a baseball game, so that in order to study him completely we need not only pitcher, but catcher, fielders, teammates, officials, fans, and the rules of the game. Our batter, as we see him in this complex transaction, simply does not exist any where else independent of the transaction. The batter is what he is because of the baseball game in which he participates and, in turn, the baseball game itself is what it is because of the batter. Each one owes its existence to the fact of active participation with and through the other. If we change either one, we change the other (15:3-4). Another baseball analogy bearing on the meaning of the perceptual transaction is cited by Cantril, who quotes the following story about three umpires swapping views as to their professional function: The first umpire said, 'Some's balls and some's strikes and I calls 'em as they is.' The second umpire said, 'Some's balls and some's strikes and I calls 'em as I sees 'em.' While the third umpire said, 'Some's balls and some's strikes but they ain't nothin' till I calls 'em (4:126).' This story nicely illustrates the basic characteristic of the transactional view of perception, which may be summarized as follows: Each percept, from the simplest to the most complex, is the product of a creative act. The raw material for this creation is lost to us since in the very act of creating, we modify it. We can never encounter a stimulus before some meaning has been assigned to it by some perceiver. Moreover, the perceiver himself becomes available to us only when he has entered into his task and has been modified in the process. Both of these statements hold true because meanings are given to things in terms of all prior experience the person has accumulated. Therefore, each perception is the beneficiary of all previous perceptions; in turn, each new perception leaves its mark on the common pool. A percept is thus a link between the past which gives it its meaning and the future which it helps to interpret. NEO-BEHAVIORIST VIEW Perception, in other words, is a form of learning. This view makes it possible to speak of the transactional position as a neo-behaviorist approach. And transactionalism clearly approximates behaviorism not only in its emphasis on learning, but also in its conception of how learning takes place. According to behavioristic learning theory, learning is stimulated and strengthened by rewards (reinforcing situations) and inhibited by punishments or disappointments. The transactional conception is analogous. Each experience or perception helps to provide us with unconscious expectations or assumptions about reality. We expect the world to behave in accord with these assumptions. Like the data supplied in a racing form about the performance of horses under particular conditions, the accumulation of our past experiences provides the basis for bets as to success or failure of our intended enterprises. These bets are repeated or discontinued depending on whether they pay off or fail to pay off. Just as a horse which has a long record of "wins" becomes a favorite and is assigned a high probability of success, certain interpretations come to be endowed with considerable confidence because of their repeated accuracy in the past. I have no hesitation in sitting down on what appears to me to be a chair, and I point my pencil at the paper in front of me with little doubt about the physical outcome. In other situations, however, past experience has not been as fully rewarding, and interpretations became long shots. The trustworthiness of friends, the reliability of colleagues, and the receptivity of students are not necessarily as punctually encountered as the seats of chairs. And even relatively simple perceptual dimensions such as size or distance may be incorrectly deduced-as has been the sad experience of many motorists. As a rule, however, perception results in confirmation, in the sense that our assumptions lead to successful con duct, thereby reinforcing our images of reality and our confidence in them. GESTA LTIST VIEW The scheme we have just outlined differs from the thinking of students of learning only in its emphasis on personal experience, which behaviorism has traditionally refused to discuss. In turn, Gestalt psychologists, who share the transactionalist bias favoring perceptual experiences as the basis of human conduct, reject the premise that such experiences are essentially learned. According to Gestalt thinking, the essential qualities of experience are, rather, built into the process of perception. The following statement by Wolfgang Köhler illustrates the Gestaltist rejection of the assumption that perceived meanings are acquired through past experience: When I see a green object, I can immediately tell the name of the color. I also know that green is used as a signal on streets and as a symbol of hope. But from this I do not conclude that the color green as such can be derived from such knowledge. Rather, I know that, as an independently existent sensory fact, it has acquired secondary meanings, and I am quite willing to recognize the advantages which these acquired meanings have in practical life. In exactly the same fashion, Gestalt Psychology holds, sensory units have acquired names, have become richly symbolic, and are now known to have certain practical uses, while nevertheless they have existed as units before any of these further facts were added. Gestalt Psychology claims that it is precisely the original segregation of circumscribed wholes which makes it possible for the sensory world to appear so utterly imbued with meaning to the adult; for, in its gradual entrance into the sensory field, meaning follows the lines drawn by natural organization; it usually enters into segregated wholes (20:139). Beside the difference, apparent in this quote, between the Gestalt emphasis on innate perceptual qualities as against the transactional stress on learning, there is another divergence in emphasis between these two views of perception. This difference rests in the fact that perception, in transactional parlance, is functional, in the sense that it exists to enable the perceiver to carry out his purposes, whereas Gestalt thinking sometimes assumes that man strives for veridicality or accuracy for its own sake. There is, however, an even greater difference between the transactional premise that perception derives its meaning from the human enterprise and the contention of some people that needs and fears can shape perceptual products. Unlike these New Look theorists, the advocates of the transactional view do not assume that we tend to see steaks when hungry, or that we have difficulty in hearing threatening language. In fact, the transactional assumption would be that it is never in the long-run interest of people to see what they want to see or to fail to perceive what doesn't meet their fancy, just as the deer is not aided by failing to notice the jumping lion. The greatest survival value lies in accurate perception. The purpose of perception is to help us cope with the world by assigning meanings to it which can stand the test of subsequent experiences. PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION The above exposition of what-essentially-the transactional view is and is not, makes possible a few statements about perception which might have special bearing on non-verbal communication. Sample experiments illustrating some of these statements may help clarify them: SHARED EXPERIENCES RESULT IN PERCEPTUAL COMMUNALITIES There are many types of experience which people have in common, almost by virtue of their human condition. These range from the elements of geometry to their intimate exposures to other human beings which create the beginning of social awareness. Common human experiences create similarities in perception and make possible easy communication. Universally shared meanings, in fact, are the simplest means of communication because they require little translation from one person's frame of reference into another. When A offers B a chair, when B smiles at C, or when C makes love to D, communication problems are minimized. Probably the most famous of the "Ames Demonstrations" (so-called because they were originated by Adelbert Ames, Jr. ) is the "Rotating Trapezoidal Window" Demonstration. This device helps to show the perceptual role of assumptions which have their origin in relatively universal human experiences. The demonstration consists of a trapezoidally-shaped window which can be slowly rotated, and which is invariably perceived as a rectangle (in perspective) oscillating from side to side. If a rod is placed in the window, it will appear to fold around it or to cut through it while the window is in motion. A box attached to one corner of the apparatus seems to take to flight. Why do those illusions occur? Ames himself offers this explanation: In his past experience the observer, in carrying out his purposes, has on innumerable occasions had to take into account and act with respect to rectangular forms, e.g., going through doors, locating windows, etc. On almost all such occasions, except in the rare case when his line of sight was normal to the door or window, the image of the rectangular configuration formed on his retina was trapezoidal. He learned to interpret the particularly characterized retinal images that exist when he looks at doors, windows, etc., as rectangular forms. Moreover, he learned to interpret the particular degree of trapezoidal distortion of his retinal images in terms of the positioning of the rectangular form to his particular viewing point ( 2:14). These assumptions about rectangularity are in most situations not apparent because they lead to accurate perceptions, so that the perceiver can argue, "I see X (rectangular) because it is X (rectangular)." The "trapezoidal window" reveals assumptions because it is deliberately designed to be misleading. DIFFERENCES IN EXPERIENCES CAUSE PERCEPTUAL DIVERGENCE The "trapezoidal window" depends for its effect on universal human experiences with rectangular objects in perspective. But are experiences such as these really equally shared by every human being? In the case of rectangularity, for instance, some people may be more intensively exposed to rectangular objects than others. Zulu members of the Bantu culture in South Africa stand out as having relatively little experience with man-made rectangles. Huts are invariably round (rondavels) or else beehive shaped, whereas in other Bantu tribes they are sometimes square or rectangular. Round huts arranged in a circular form with round stockades to fence in animals, constitute a typical African homestead (kraal). Fields follow the irregular contours of the rolling land, and never seem to be laid out in the neat rectangular plots so characteristic of western culture. The typical Zulu hut has no windows, and no word for such an aperture exists. In the more primitive beehive grass huts, doors are merely round entrance holes; in the round mud huts, doors are amorphous, seldom if ever neatly rectangular. Cooking pots are round or gourd-shaped . . . (1:106). When tested with the "trapezoidal window," in a study by Allport and Pettigrew, non-westernized Zulus tended to perceive the illusion less frequently-under sub optimal conditions-than did westernized persons who have more intensive experience with rectangularity (1). One can infer from this fact that differences in experience, even in cumulative experience that is common to people, can create subtle differences in the way the world is perceived. PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES CAN BE READILY PRODUCED Social psychologists are frequently concerned with attitudes, values, and habits that are prevalent among groups of people and are transmitted from generation to generation. Less obviously, ways of perceiving also come to be acquired and transmitted collectively. Two experiments, both involving a relatively new research technique, may serve to illustrate this fact: In 1955, a psychologist named Engel published a set of observations involving subjects who had been exposed to two different pictures-one to the left eye and the other to the right (9). One effect he discussed is that of perceptual dominance by more familiar pictures when they are paired with less familiar pictures. "A 'right side up' face, for instance, tends to perceptually prevail over the same face 'upside down.'" This observation has given rise to a number of experiments, one of which included matched Mexican and American observers. These persons were exposed to several sets of pictures, in each of which a typically American scene (such as a baseball game) was paired with a typically Mexican view (like a bullfight). The investigator, Bagby, concludes: Ss report scenes of their own culture as predominant in binocular rivalry over scenes from another culture. The national cultural differences appear critical in affecting perceptual predominance in the majority of the stereogram slide pairs . . . Differences in ways of perceiving come about as a consequence of differences in past experiences and purposes. These in turn emerge from influences in the home, in the school, and in the various groups with which an individual identifies. Thus, under conditions of perceptual conflict as found in the binocular rivalry situation, those impingements possessing the more immediate first person meaning would be expected to predominate in visual awareness (3:334). This statement, of course, need not be confined to past experiences associated with different cultures. Subgroups in the same culture also frequently become differentially indoctrinated, and such differences in indoctrination should leave their mark on perception. To test for this possibility, terminal candidates in a Midwestern police training program were presented with a set of slides, each of which featured a violent scene for one eye, and a similar but non-violent picture for the other. Beginning students in the training program and comparable liberal arts students served as control groups. The persons trained in police work saw a considerably larger number of "violent" pictures in this situation. The investigators comment: Assuming that extremely violent scenes are comparatively unfamiliar, we would thus expect violence to be relatively infrequently perceived in true binocular rivalry. We would predict the type of result we obtained from our Control Groups. We could assume that law enforcement training supplements this experiential deficit in the area of violence and crime. Unusual experiences, after all, become familiar' in the course of any specialization. The funeral director or the medical intern, for instance, may learn to accept corpses as part and parcel of everyday experience. The dedicated nudist may acquire a special conception of familiar attire. The air pilot may come to find nothing unusual about glancing down out of a window at a bank of clouds. In the same fashion, law enforcement training can produce a revision of unconscious expectations of violence and crime. This does not mean that the law enforcer necessarily comes to exaggerate the prevalence of violence. It means that the law enforcer may come to accept crime as a familiar personal experience, one which he himself is not surprised to encounter. The acceptance of crime as a familiar experience in turn increases the ability or readiness to perceive violence where clues to it are potentially avail able (29:392). Subtle perceptual differences of this sort, although universally present, only manifest themselves for our inspection under special conditions such as binocular rivalry. At other times, we may deal with people under the assumption that their perceptions coincide with ours, although in fact differences in past experience have produced fundamental divergences in outlook. The same point holds true over time, since research shows that subtle changes in perception continuously take place without our being aware of them. To illustrate: Two photographs, each of a different face, were mounted in a stereoscopic device. When the observer first looked into the stereoscope, he was presented with just one of the faces with normal illumination. Then the illumination was cut. Next, he was given the first face normally lit, with the second face under very low illumination. The procedure was repeated with a slight increase in light on the second face, and so on until the subject was observing both faces each with the same normal light. At each step he was asked whether any change had taken place in what he saw. Most said they saw no change! But the second phase of the experiment was even more startling. In the same way, but small steps, the light on the first photograph was reduced to zero. At this point, the observer was looking at the second face, quite different from the first. He continued to claim that no change had taken place, that he was still looking at the same face. Engel reports that observers were much perplexed when they were again presented with the original face (8). ANY GIVEN EVENT IS DIFFERENTLY PERCEIVED BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE The more complex a perceptual situation becomes, the greater the tendency for variations in perception to occur. Whereas a chair, for instance, provides a minimum of opportunity for differences in perception-at least, for members of our Western culture--any standard social situation constitutes a veritable perceptual cafeteria. This is the case not only because complexity multiplies the opportunity for the perceiver to assign meanings-for instance, one can choose to at tend to one of many aspects of a complex situation in preference to others--but also because complexity usually evokes a wide gamut of personal experiences and needs which enter into the assignment of meaning. Hastorf and Cantril illustrate this process in their study of the infamous football game between Dartmouth and Princeton which took place on November 23, 1951. The events which occurred in this game are conservatively catalogued as follows: A few minutes after the opening kick-off, it became apparent that the game was going to be a rough one. The referees were kept busy blowing their whistles and penalizing both sides. In the second quarter, Princeton's star left the game with a broken nose. In the third quarter, a Dartmouth player was taken off the field with a broken leg. Tempers flared both during and after the game. The official statistics of the game, which Princeton won, showed that Dartmouth was penalized 70 yards, Princeton 25, not counting more than a few plays in which both sides were penalized (13:129). The sequel of these events was a prolonged and intense exchange of recriminations between players, students, coaches, administrative officials, student publications, alumni and partisans of the two universities, each of whom claimed to have sustained the brunt of the injuries. Hastorf and Cantril submitted a questionnaire concerning the game to both Princeton and Dartmouth students and alumni, the results of which confirmed the divergent position of the two sides relating to the game. A film of the game also was shown to some 100 students; it yielded widely discrepant reports of the number of infractions committed by each side and the seriousness of these in fractions. The Princeton students, for instance, "saw" the Dartmouth team make more than twice the number of infractions "seen" by Dartmouth students in watching the same film. They also "saw" two "flagrant" to each "mild" infraction for the Dartmouth team, and one "flagrant" to three "mild" offenses for their own team, a ratio considerably dissimilar to that of ratings by Dartmouth students. Hastorf and Cantril conclude: . . . the 'same' sensory impingements emanating from the football field, transmitted through the visual mechanism to the brain, obviously gave rise to different experiences in different people. The significances assumed by different happenings for different people depend in large part on the purposes people bring to the occasion and the assumptions they have of the purposes and probable behavior of other people involved (13:132) . . . . It is inaccurate and misleading to say that different people have different 'attitudes' concerning the same 'thing.' For the 'thing' simply is not the same for different people whether the 'thing' is a football game, a presidential candidate, Communism, or spinach. We do not simply 'react to' a happening or to some impingement from the environment in a determined way (except in behavior that has become reflexive or habitual). We behave according to what we bring to the occasion, and what each of us brings to the occasion is more or less unique (13:133). ALL ASPECTS OF A PERCEPT ARE RELATED TO EACH OTHER A fundamental discovery of Gestalt psychology was that the basic unit of perception is the organized configuration which the perceiver perceives. Perceptual objects, in other words, function as indivisible units. This statement extends beyond the geometric or formal properties of stimuli. Thus, the perceived motion of the Ames "trapezoidal window" results from its perception as a rectangle in perspective: Object-identification and movement-direction are dependent on each other. Hastorf has shown that the perceived size of a white square can range widely, depending on whether it is identified as an envelope or a calling card (12). This perceived size, in turn, can determine the apparent distance of the figure from the observer. Less obviously, positive or negative feelings can also determine perceived size and distance. Thus, G. H. Smith set out to determine whether "faces regarded as friendly or pleasant" would be seen as "larger than those regarded as unfriendly or unpleasant in order to appear opposite the same target post (27:47)." His findings confirmed these expectations. He concludes: Ss responded to the meaning which faces elicited in this situation; and . . . this meaning emerged out of the assumptions, attitudes, expectations, purposes, and special sensitizations which Ss had acquired through experience. . . . The fact that 'pleasant' or 'liked' faces were made larger (closer) than others indicates that attributed meaning, rather than size of retinal image alone, determined the responses . . . perception of a human face literally changed before the eyes of the Ss as a function of alterations in beliefs, assumptions, etc. (27 :60-61) . Another set of experiments showing a relationship between affective significance and the perceptions of physical properties was provided by the "honi phenomenon" (30). This effect was first observed in an Ames Demonstration known as the "monocular distorted room," which is a geometrically distorted structure that looks square when viewed with one eye. Since the room appears to be nor mal (although it is in fact distorted), any face viewed through a window of the room becomes expanded or contracted. The "honi phenomenon" was born one day when this customary illusion did not materialize. The face which refused to change belonged to a New York attorney, and the viewer was his devoted wife. Subsequent investigation showed that it is not uncommon for newlyweds to perceive their marital partners as relatively unchanged when optical distortions have in fact taken place. Similar phenomena can occur involving other kinds of affects (as with amputees and authority figures). The lesson to be drawn from such in stances is that the apparent physical properties of a percept cannot be divorced from its other connotations. REFERENCES (1) ALLPORT, G. W., and P ETTIGREW, T. F. "Cultural Influence on the Perception of Movement: the Trapezoidal Illusion among Zulus." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55:104-13; 1957. (2) Ames, A., Jr. "Visual Perception and the Rotating Trapezoidal Window." Psychological Monographs 65:1-31; 1951. (3) BAGBY, J. W. "A Cross-cultural Study of Perceptual Predominance in Binocular Rivalry." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54:331-34; 1957. (4) CANTRIL, H. "Perception and Interpersonal Relations." American Journal of Psychiatry 114:119-26; 1957. (5) CANTRIL, H., AMES, A., HASTORF, A. H., and I TTELSON, W. H. "Psychology and Scientific Research." Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by F. P. Kilpatrick. New York: New York University, 1961. p. 6-35. (6) DEUTSCH M A AN, P . J., BARROW, L C., Jr., and Mc MILLAN, A. "The Efficiency of Different Modes of Communication." AV Communication Review 10:3: 176-78; May June 1962. (7) DEWEY, J., and BENTLEY, A. F. Knowing and the Known. Boston: Beacon Press, 1949. (8) ENGEL, E. "Binocular Methods in Psychological Research." Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by F. P. Kilpatrick. New York University Press, 1961. p. 290-305. (9) ENGEL, E. "The Role of Content in Binocular Resolution." American Journal of Psychology 69:87-91; 1956. (10) FINN, J. D. "Some Notes for an Essay on Griswold and Reading." AV Communication Review 7:111-21; 1959. (11) GERBNER, G. "Education and the Challenge of Mass Culture." AV Communication Review 7:264-78; 1959. (12) HASTORF, A. H. "The Influence of Suggestion on the Relationship Between Stimulus Size and Perceived Distance." Journal of Psychology 29:195-217; 1950. (13) HASTORF, A. H., and CANTRIL, H. "They Saw A Game: A Case Study." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 49:129-34; 1954. (14) HAYAKAWA, S . I . "How to Be Sane Though Negro." Contact I. Sausalito, California: Angel Island Publications, 1958. p. 5-20. (15) I TTELSON, W. H., and CANTRIL, H. Perception: A Transactional Approach. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954. (16) KELLEY, E. C. "Education is Communication." Etc. 12:248-56; 1955. (17) KILPATRICK, F. P. "Assumptions and Perception: Three Experiments." Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by F. P. Kilpatrick. New York: New York University Press, 1961. p. 257-89. (18) KILPATRICK, F. P. "Perception Theory and General Semantics." Etc. 12:257-64; 1955. (19) KOCH-WESER, ELK E. "A Q-Study in Role Identification Using A Sample of Advertising Photographs." Master's Thesis. Michigan State University, 1961. (20) KÜHLER, W. Gestalt Psychology. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1947. (21) KUMATA, H. "Teaching Advertising by Television-Study II." Mimeo. East Lansing: Communications Research Center, Michigan State University, 1958. (22) KUMATA, H., and MACLEAN, M. S., Jr. "Education and the Problems of the New Media in the United States of America." The Year Book of Education. Tarrytown-on Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1960. (23) MACLEAN, M. S., Jr. "Critical Analysis of 12 Recent Title VII Research Reports." Research Abstracts and Analytical Review, Installment 4. p. A-102-14. (AV Communication Review, Vol. 10, No. 3; May-June 1962.) (24) NORBERC, K. "Perception Research and Audio-Visual Education." AY Communication Review 1:18-29; 1953. (25) OsHim, K. "Effects of Smiles, Subject Arrangement, and Lighting on Reader Satisfaction from Pictures of Groups of People." Master's Thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1956. (26) Purr, D. A. "The Import of the Word `Transaction' in Dewey's Philosophy." Etc. 12 :299-308 ; 1955. (27) SMITH, G. H. "Size-distance Judgments of Human Faces." Journal of Genetic Psychology 49:45-64; 1953. (28) TOCH, H., and CANTRIL, H. "The Learning of Values: An Experimental Inquiry." Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by F. P. Kilpatrick. New York: New York University Press, 1961. p. 321-31. (29) TocH, H., and SCHULTE, R. "Readiness to Perceive Violence as a Result of Police Training." British Journal of Psychology 52:389-93; 1961. (30) WITTREICH, W. J., GRACE, M., and RADCLIFFE, K. B., Jr. "Three Experiments in Selective Perceptual Distortion." Explorations in Transactional Psychology, edited by F. P. Kilpatrick. New York: New York University Press, 1961. p. 188-202. Also in Part 3:
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